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ESSAY: THE BLESSINGS AND CURSES            
OF PIECEMEAL REFORM 
Thad Kousser* 
Although many expected 2010 to be the year of comprehensive 
constitutional change in California, plans for calling a constitutional 
convention in the state collapsed. Instead, interest groups and 
legislators—whose goals were disjointed and often diametrically 
opposed—worked to pass five separate “piecemeal reforms” amending 
the constitution. This Essay examines the process of piecemeal reform, 
drawing on California history, jurisprudence in the state, and the 
experiences of other states to lay out the benefits as well as the costs of 
this approach to constitutional change. It concludes by suggesting an 
alternative approach to reform that seeks to capture the blessings while 
avoiding the curses of the piecemeal process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The year 2010 was supposed to be the year of comprehensive 
constitutional reform1 in California. With influential columnist Dan 
Walters calling the state “ungovernable”2 and former state librarian 
Kevin Starr warning that California might become the “first failed 
state in America,”3 the magnitude of California’s constitutional crisis 
seemed to necessitate a far-reaching revision of its governing plan. A 
majority of voters favored making “fundamental changes” to the 
constitution.4 The Repair California campaign, an outgrowth of the 
prominent business group called the Bay Area Council, held a series 
of well-attended town hall meetings across the state throughout 2009. 
It also proposed a concrete plan to place a call for a citizens’ 
constitutional convention on the November 2010 ballot. 5 The 
convention call was backed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
endorsed by reform groups such as Common Cause, and 
enthusiastically embraced by the state’s major newspapers. 6 This 
 
 1. I use the term “reform” here in the neutral fashion often employed by political scientists. 
Abandoning the hope that every well-intentioned reform will bring positive effects, but refraining 
from placing “reform” in quotation marks to signify the belief that all attempts at governmental 
progress are hopeless, I simply use “constitutional reform” to indicate any proposed change of 
electoral and governing structures. 
 2. For but one example of the enunciation of this verdict, see Dan Walters, Candidates’ 
Promises Defy Reality, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 13, 2010, at A3. 
 3. Starr is quoted in Paul Harris, Will California Become America’s First Failed State?, 
OBSERVER (London), Oct. 4, 2009, at 32, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/04/ 
california-failing-state-debt (quoting Kevin Starr). 
 4. CAL. OP. INDEX, A DIGEST SUMMARY CALIFORNIA VOTERS OPINION ABOUT STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND RELATED ISSUES 1 (2009), available at http://www.field.com/ 
fieldpollonline/subscribers/COI-09-Oct-CA-Constitution-Reform.pdf. The October 2009 Field 
Poll, jointly designed by the Field Poll and a group of academics at Stanford, U.C. Berkeley, U.C. 
San Diego, and CSU Sacramento (including the author) asked a random sample of 1,005 
registered voters in California a series of twenty questions regarding constitutional reform. When 
they were asked “Do fundamental changes need to be made to the state constitution or are 
fundamental changes not needed?,” 51 percent of respondents said changes needed to be made, 
38 percent said fundamental changes were not needed, and 11 percent were undecided or had no 
opinion. See CAL. OP. INDEX, supra. Unless otherwise noted, the public opinion data cited below 
draws on this survey. 
 5. Press Release, Repair Cal., California Constitutional Convention Campaign Put On Hold 
(Feb. 12, 2010) (on file with author); California Constitutional Convention, REPAIR CAL., 
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/about_california_convention.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 6. John Grubb, Californians Have the Opportunity to Fix State, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2010, 
at E2 (discussing the state’s major newspapers’ positive response to the idea of having a 
constitutional convention); George Skelton, Gov. Gets Second Wind as a Reformer, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2009, at B1 (“Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger says he ‘absolutely’ loves the idea of 
holding a constitutional convention to overhaul state government.”); California’s Constitution—
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appeared to be Californians’ golden opportunity to revamp the 
political structure of the Golden State in a coordinated, wide-ranging 
leap of reform. Yet the campaign for a convention collapsed as 
quickly as it rose. Repair California generated grassroots excitement, 
but failed to generate the money necessary to gather enough 
signatures to reach the ballot or the funds to run a serious statewide 
campaign. By February 2010, it abandoned its proposal for 
comprehensive change. The state will instead be taking small steps, 
if any, toward change. 
A series of propositions that aim at making piecemeal reform 
soon filled the void that this collapse left in the state’s constitutional 
conversation. A collection of five initiative constitutional 
amendments (ICAs) appeared on the November 2010 ballot. Backed 
by more narrow interests and often in conflict with one another, these 
piecemeal reforms addressed issues ranging from the voting 
thresholds required for passing budgets or raising fees to the 
redistricting process to the protection of city finances from state 
raids. Amendments that would alter legislative term limits and 
restructure the state’s budget process appear to be headed to the 
ballot in 2012.7 More of the ideas backed by California Forward, the 
cautious reform group that outlasted the incandescent Repair 
California, may appear in future elections. The sum of all of their 
parts could bring change as profound as what might emerge from a 
constitutional convention, but the prospects for passage of any one of 
them is far from certain. Is this any way to rewrite a constitution? 
Many observers complain that it is not, bemoaning the lost 
opportunity to make changes commensurate with the magnitude of 
the state’s challenges.8 Others voice their concern with the role that 
moneyed interests play in pushing piecemeal changes designed for 
 
Time For Overhaul, Common Sense, CAL. COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/site/ 
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=5288637 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010) (“The Board of California 
Common Cause has voted unanimously to support the call for a California Constitutional 
Convention.”). 
 7. For analysis of pending propositions and previews of future reforms, see Ballot 
Measures, CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG, http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures-2010-11 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 8. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 26 (2d ed. 2008) (“Piecemeal reforms . . . are 
politically tempting because they create the impression that a single solution can resolve a 
complex problem. However, the complexity and diversity of the current problems . . . require a 
broader set of reforms.”). 
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their authors’ advantage onto the ballot. 9 Such complaints are not 
new: observers have long been dissatisfied with the state’s halting 
history of reform. In their thoughtful critique of the history of 
constitutional reform in California, Joe Mathews and Mark Paul see 
the series of half-steps in the past creating a “[n]ew mess built upon 
old mess.” 10 
Is the piecemeal path down which our state is currently headed a 
dead end, or can it lead to lasting and rational reform? This Essay 
analyzes the blessings and curses of piecemeal reform through the 
lenses of constitutional law, political science, and comparative 
historical study. It is grounded in the specifics of California 
institutions, legal doctrine, and today’s public opinion but yields 
lessons that may apply to reform more generally. At any rate, the 
analysis moves beyond the here and now by taking its lessons from 
other states and from other eras of California’s history. 
I begin by laying out the three routes that can lead to 
constitutional change in California: calling a constitutional 
convention; crafting legislative reform; and, in the piecemeal 
approach, placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot. First, I 
review the basic steps in each path, the legal constraints placed on 
them, and the political dynamics that shape their eventual outcomes. 
Comparing the processes at the beginning facilitates a later 
discussion of what might be lost or gained by taking one particular 
route. 
Then, I focus on the current piecemeal approach, laying out the 
blessings that this much-maligned process can bring. It can make a 
venerable constitutional law theory—“Brandeisian experiment-
ation”—a reality. One-at-a-time reforms may solve the political 
problem that has doomed many comprehensive conventions in other 
states and in California’s other eras: their proposed reforms fail at the 
ballot box when they are brought down by the least popular part of 
their package. Polling evidence shows that California’s proposed 
constitutional convention was vulnerable to that fate. 11 By contrast, 
the piecemeal approach gives voters a menu of constitutional options 
 
 9. See id. at 14–15. 
 10. See JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: HOW REFORM BROKE THE 
GOLDEN STATE AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 18 (2010). 
 11. See,e.g., infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.  
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to pick and choose from as they please. It also avoids opening up the 
Pandora’s box of tenuously related issues such as immigration and 
same-sex marriage which many Californians view as fair game in a 
convention and which drives voter opinion on many rules of 
government. 
Yet there are plentiful reasons to be concerned about piecemeal 
reform. One of the curses is simply that legal doctrine limits the 
scope of constitutional change through the initiative process, 
although that doctrine has been interpreted in ways that rarely 
constrain constitutional change in California. Another worry is that 
reforms authored by warring factions may clash and distort each 
other’s effects. In contrast, a comprehensive approach allows 
constitutional designers to take seriously political science findings 
that institutional changes are by nature complex. One of their 
unintended consequences might be that the interaction between two 
reforms alters the effects of each. Further, the realities of funding 
propositions in the state today present a catch-22 for reformers: it is 
more difficult to find funding for broad, general-interest reform 
efforts than for narrow proposals, but when those narrow proposals 
qualify for the ballot, they fare poorly with voters, who see them as 
helping a single interest. Finally, the record of tight margins of 
victory for many major piecemeal reforms raises concerns about a 
razor’s-edge majority imposing rules on a voting minority that often 
contains many of California’s racial- and ethnic-minority voters. 
To conclude, I present another potential path to reform—a series 
of bipartisan, single-subject logrolls—that seeks to capture the 
blessings while avoiding the curses of the piecemeal approach. I 
provide examples of three such logrolls that could make significant, 
ideologically balanced changes to California’s constitution. 
II.  THREE ROUTES TO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The process of constitutional change in California can begin in any 
of three ways. These distinct avenues to reform can be pursued 
separately or simultaneously. First, legislators (or perhaps voters) can 
call a constitutional convention, a gathering of delegates who could 
present a wide-ranging set of proposals. Second, legislators—acting, 
if they like, on the recommendations of a constitutional revision 
commission that they have appointed—may propose major changes 
to the constitution. Both of these processes can be used to offer 
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“revisions” to the constitution, making fundamental changes to the 
state’s governing structure. More limited changes to the constitution 
can be made in the third piecemeal process: legislators themselves or 
citizen groups can author constitutional “amendments.” 
 I emphasize the key difference between a revision and an 
amendment. This distinction has been drawn by the California 
Supreme Court since 1894. 12 A revision brings “changes in the 
nature of our basic governmental plan” 13 or a “far-reaching change in 
our governmental framework.” 14 While often a matter of contentious 
judicial interpretation, 15 the line between a revision and amendment 
is what divides wholesale from piecemeal reform. 
Most importantly, no matter where change originates, voters are 
the final arbiters, as a majority of voters must approve the products 
of each process at a statewide election. This roadblock stands in the 
way of each avenue to reform, making political calculations 
paramount for those with serious interests in successful reform. My 
comparison of these processes keeps in mind the electoral forces that 
bear on all three processes. Each path also faces its own practical and 
legal constraints, which I point out briefly in the following sections. 
A.  Route #1: Calling a Constitutional Convention 
The most obvious path toward rewriting a constitution, calling a 
convention, can also be the most complicated and politically 
perilous. Currently, California’s constitution sets forth a clear 
convention process. 16 With a two-thirds vote in each house, state 
legislators can ask voters to call a convention. If a majority of voters 
at the next statewide general election support this call, the legislature 
has six months to provide for a convention and elect delegates from 
districts of equal population. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of these provisions and the 
Golden State’s near-constant appetite for reform, California has only 
held one convention (in 1878–79) since drafting its original 
 
 12. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894). 
 13. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 
1286 (Cal. 1978). 
 14. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990). 
 15. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State 
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1539 (2009). 
 16. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
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constitution in 1849. 17 This convention has variously been described 
as “the greatest civic disaster” 18 and as a distinctively Western 
document that “expanded the purview of state government, creating 
new laws and institutions.” 19 Despite receiving criticism for its lack 
of delegate diversity and the anti-immigrant policies it advanced, the 
1878–79 convention did include important gains for labor and result 
in a new constitution passed by the voters. 20 More telling is the 
difficulty that elected leaders and reformers have had in bringing 
their subsequent calls for a convention to fruition. Four successive 
times—in 1898, 1914, 1928, and 1930—voters rejected calls for a 
convention that the legislature had placed on ballots. 21 When the 
voters finally supported a convention call as one of twenty-three 
propositions that appeared on the 1934 ballot, the legislature then 
failed to fund and convene it. 22 Since that time, reform advocates 
have not secured the necessary two-thirds majority in each house to 
put a convention call before the voters. 23 
Stymied in the legislature, the reform advocates who began 
Repair California in 2009 held a series of town hall meetings across 
the state to push for a ballot measure giving citizens the right to call a 
constitutional convention. 24 They crafted an ICA granting this right 
and began a drive to gather signatures to place it on the November 
2010 ballot. 25 At the same time, they gathered signatures to qualify 
an initiative that would issue that call, convening a group of 464 
delegates selected partially through appointments made by local 
government and partially by bringing randomly selected citizens 
 
 17. MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 10, at 51; A Brief History of the California Constitution, 
REPAIR CAL., http://www.repaircalifornia.org/about_california_convention_cahistory.php (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2010); see CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 8, at 37. 
 18. See MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 10, at 22. 
 19. Amy Bridges, Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the 
Western States, STUD. AM. POL. DEV., Spring 2008, at 58. 
 20. Calling a Constitutional Convention, CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG, 
http://www.californiachoices.org/node/148 (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Eugene C. Lee, The Revision of California’s Constitution, 3 CAL. POL’Y SEMINAR 2–3 
(1991). 
 23. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 8, at 209. 
 24. California Constitutional Convention, supra note 5. 
 25. Mike Aldax, State Seeking Conventional Wisdom on Constitution, S.F. EXAMINER 
(Nov. 27, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/State-seeking-conventional-
wisdom-on-constitution-76349807.html. 
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together to elect some of their own as delegates. 26 The Los Angeles 
Times 27 and other major newspapers backed this approach, but 
constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky criticized it. 28 
The constitutionality of both measures was in doubt because the 
first may have constituted a constitutional revision impermissibly 
made through the amendment process, and the second may have run 
afoul of Voting Rights Act provisions. 29 Yet the constitutionality of 
the measures was never tested. Repair California’s signature drive 
was crippled from the start: it faced a boycott from Sacramento’s 
major signature-gathering firms, which feared that a convention 
might lead to restrictions on direct democracy, which would be bad 
for their businesses. 30 In any case, Repair California failed to raise 
sufficient funds from the members of the Bay Area Council, the 
business group that had spawned it, and abandoned its ballot drive in 
the spring of 2010. 
Regardless of how a convention is called, it brings with it many 
potential benefits, while also posing challenging questions. 31 A 
convention would create a deliberative, transparent process that 
enables comprehensive reform. It would be open to public scrutiny, 
and the debate would force delegates to assemble a solid coalition 
behind any proposed change. The proposals that convention 
delegates made would not be limited by the single-subject rule that 
applies to piecemeal reform, as I later discuss, nor would the 
delegates be limited to amending rather than revising the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Editorial, A Plan That Works: Ballot Measures Proposed by Repair California to Set Up 
a Constitutional Convention Deserve Support, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A25. 
 28. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., The Wrong Fix for California, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009, 
at A27. 
 29. Video on Demand: Getting to Reform: Avenues to Constitutional Change in 
California—Comparing Avenues to Reform: Initiatives, Revision Commission, or Convention 
(The California Channel 2009), available at http://www.calchannel.com/channel/viewvideo/772 
(highlighting a debate between panelists Pamela S. Karlan of Stanford Law School, Christopher 
S. Elmendorf of the University of California, Davis, School of Law, and Richard Temple 
regarding the constitutional merits of the Repair California proposals). 
 30. John Diaz, A Sign of State’s Dysfunction, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21, 2010, at E6; Lisa 
Vorderbrueggen, Ballot Advocates Cry Foul: State Constitutional Convention Group Eyes 
Lawsuit, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at 1A. 
 31. For a thorough discussion of state constitutional conventions, see the authoritative works 
of JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006) and G. ALAN 
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998). 
  
578 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:569 
constitution. A convention would also likely spark a larger civic 
debate about reform issues. 
But calling a convention would also force Californians to 
grapple with an unfamiliar set of questions. Who should the 
delegates be, and would their proposals reflect what Californians 
want? Should the districts for delegates (or random selection 
mechanisms) count all California residents equally, or be restricted to 
legal residents or to voters? Might a convention veer away from 
governmental reform into the many policy areas covered by our 
current constitution, which addresses social issues such as same-sex 
marriage and contains entire articles on motor vehicle revenues and 
usury? With over a century gone by since California’s last 
experiment with a convention, another trial would certainly bring 
unanticipated challenges in its implementation. 
Success, of course, is not guaranteed to the product of the 
convention’s labor. Delegates could propose a wholly new 
constitution, a package of revisions, or a series of separate revisions, 
but each would need to garner majority support in a statewide 
election. A nationwide study shows that, since 1930, there have been 
not only thirty-five successful conventions but also twenty-seven 27 
failures that did not lead to any voter-approved reforms. 32 Would 
California’s convention propose popular reforms, as Illinois’s did in 
1970, 33 or become mired in the pitfalls that doomed New York’s 
1967 attempt? 34 
B.  Route #2: Revision Through the Legislature 
The second route to comprehensive revision goes directly 
through the legislature. With two-thirds votes in both the state 
assembly and the senate—and without consulting the governor—
members of the legislature may place a revision on the ballot for 
 
 32. Vladimir Kogan, Lessons from Recent State Constitutional Conventions, CAL. J. POL. & 
POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 5. 
 33. REPAIR CAL., 1970 ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION, available at 
http://www.repaircalifornia.org/Docs/Illinois.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2010); Calling a 
Constitutional Convention, supra note 20. 
 34. Peter Galie, Professor, Canisius Coll., Remarks at the Getting to Reform Conference: 
Avenues to Constitutional Change in California (Oct. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.californiachoices.org/sites/californiachoices/files/New%20York%201967.pdf; 
Calling a Constitutional Convention, supra note 20. 
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voter approval. 35 Revisions may be crafted through either of two 
deliberative processes. Lawmakers have the option of convening a 
panel of experts, known as a constitutional revision commission, to 
review the state’s current constitutional structure and recommend 
changes. Or they may simply delegate the task to a committee of 
their own members, as both houses did when they each created a 
Select Committee on Improving State Government in 2009 to 
consider reform measures. 36 Any proposal authored by a commission 
or a committee that receives two-thirds votes will be placed before 
voters at the next statewide election, where it must receive a simple 
majority of the vote in order to pass. 
The fact that the 2009–10 session, held during a time of widely 
declared constitutional crisis, failed to produce a proposed revision 
(though it did generate two proposed amendments) demonstrates the 
political challenge that the two-thirds-vote requirement poses to this 
process. Because no single party has controlled the necessary 
supermajority in recent decades, constitutional reform requires a 
bipartisan deal. This has become increasingly difficult as voters and 
legislators in California have polarized along partisan lines and as the 
widening ideological chasm between the parties makes cross-party 
compromises less frequent. 37 On the other hand, in the rare case that 
a revision attracts support from members of both parties, its 
bipartisan nature and endorsements bode well for its chances at the 
ballot box. 
This dynamic is illustrated by the pattern of mixed success by 
the two constitutional revision commissions convened by the 
legislature over the past half-century. In 1963, the legislature 
launched a revision commission that, over the next decade, 
shepherded through major changes to the state constitution. 38 For 
example, the commission’s work greatly trimmed the length of the 
 
 35. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
 36. Press Release, Cal. State Assembly Democratic Caucus, Steinberg, Bass Appoint 
Assembly and Senate Select Committees on Improving State Government (Sept. 3, 2009), 
available at http://democrats.assembly.ca.gov/Issues/California_Reform/Press/ 
20090903PR01.aspx. 
 37. Thad Kousser, Does Partisan Polarization Lead to Policy Gridlock in California?, CAL. 
J. POL. & POL’Y, Jan. 2010, at 1, 19; Seth E. Masket, It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative 
Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 482, 
482–83 (2007). 
 38. See Lee, supra note 22, at 4–7. 
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constitution and resulted in the creation of a professional, full-time 
state legislature. The ballot argument for the commission’s 1966 
Proposition 1A was signed by both gubernatorial candidates that 
year, Ronald Reagan and Pat Brown, and its bipartisan support 
helped it to pass by a three-to-one margin. 39 However, the revision 
commission had more trouble finding common ground on ways to 
reform the state’s initiative process, where a conflict between 
business leaders and reformers stopped major changes to direct 
democracy from emerging from the legislature in the 1960s. 40 
In the face of a recession-induced public fiscal crisis in the early 
1990s, the legislature convened another revision commission to 
recommend major reforms to the state constitution. After eighteen 
months of deliberations, the commission issued its final 
recommendations, 41 calling for broad changes to the state charter: 
lengthening legislative term limits, requiring the governor and 
lieutenant governor to run on the same ticket, and making certain 
elected posts—including the state treasurer and insurance 
commissioner—governor-appointed. 42 By the time the commission 
issued its recommendations in 1996, however, the economy had 
rebounded and the crisis in state politics had receded. The legislature 
showed little interest in constitutional reforms, choosing not to vote 
on the commission’s recommendations. 
Though it has more recent precedent, the commission approach 
shares many of the advantages as well as some of the drawbacks of a 
convention. Because revisions may be made through this process, it 
allows for fundamental changes to the state’s governmental structure 
and operations. In addition, it permits public deliberation by a 
representative body and allows the experts—who are most familiar 
with various constitutional alternatives and their likely 
consequences—to propose reforms. Yet, because of this, critics point 
to the inherent conflict of interest in entrusting reform of a political 
system to the elected officials (or their appointees) who have thrived 
 
 39. THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF LEGISLATIVE 
PROFESSIONALISM 13 (2005); Sherry Bebitch Jeffe, A History Lesson on Part-Time Lawmaking, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at A2. 
 40. See A Brief History of the California Constitution, supra note 17. 
 41. CAL. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM’N, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 2 (1996). 
 42. Id. at 3–4. 
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under it. 43 Because legislative amendments and revisions require 
two-thirds of lawmakers to agree on any changes before presenting 
them to voters, a small minority of elected officials can block 
changes that many Californians might find appealing. The deals that 
emerge from the legislature must by the nature of this process 
include compromises, and though this elite agreement gives them a 
good chance at ultimate passage, it does not guarantee their mass 
appeal. 
C.  Route #3: Amending the Constitution in Piecemeal Fashion 
Instead of revising the constitution through a deliberative 
process, reformers could seek piecemeal amendments. Such 
amendments can begin in one of two ways. They may be placed on 
the ballot by legislators through a two-thirds vote in each house, as 
happened with the successful Proposition 14 44 and the unsuccessful 
Proposition 15. 45 Legislators need not deliberate over these 
amendments, and, in fact, Proposition 14 reached the ballot—and 
later the constitution—as a concession made by Senator Abel 
Maldonado to a swing voter on an important budget deal. 46 The other 
path to piecemeal reform is the ICA, which can be authored by any 
average citizen possessing the resources to gather signatures equal in 
number to 8 percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial race. 47 In 
2010, an ICA required 694,354 valid signatures. 48 The scale of this 
endeavor requires the use of paid signature-gathering firms that 
 
 43. This criticism most often refers to the conflict of interest in redistricting, but legislators 
have also been far more reticent than voters to impose term limits and campaign finance 
regulations on themselves. See KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 12–14; John Pippen et al., Election 
Reform and Direct Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulations in the American States, 30 AM. 
POL. RES. 559, 559–60 (2002). 
 44. California Proposition 14 is now codified at CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 5–6. 
 45. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 
2010: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 66–75 (2010) available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/ 
vig2010/general/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf; Jill Stewart, Proposition 15 Fails Miserably 
Because California Voters Can’t Stomach Paying to Elect Jerks, LA WKLY. BLOGS (June 9, 
2010, 10:16 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer/election/prop-15-campaign-finance-fails/. 
 46. Bob Egelko, Open Primary Proposition Survives First Legal Challenge, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 15, 2010, at C1. 
 47. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a)–(b). 
 48. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION—
STATEMENT OF VOTE 19 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_primary/ 
17_initiative_ref_qual.pdf (noting the Initiative and Referendum Qualification Requirements for 
2007–2010). 
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charge $1–3 per signature, many of which turn out to be invalid. 49 
Initiative campaigns thus typically submit 1.1 million signatures, 
making the effective cost of entry into this path of “citizen” reform at 
least $2 million. 50 
Though it is costly, this path poses fewer barriers than other 
routes to reform since no political bargains are necessary. Any 
organized group with the resources to qualify an initiative can write 
the text as it pleases, dictating the terms of a bargain that they set 
before voters and, if the initiative is successful, reaping the rewards 
of their power to set the agenda. 51 For well-funded groups, this 
power is worth the price. The ballot for the California General 
Election on November 2, 2010, featured five ICAs, which qualified 
through ballot drives funded by unions; 52 the California League of 
Cities and other local government organizations; 53 business 
associations and taxpayer rights groups; 54 the independently wealthy 
Charles T. Munger, Jr.; 55 and an alliance between congressional 
candidates and the former Mighty Morphin Power Rangers producer 
 
 49. John M. de Figueiredo et al., Financing Direct Democracy: Revisiting the Research on 
Campaign Spending and Citizen Initiatives 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16356, 2010) (“With only 150 days to collect these names, nearly all initiative authors pay 
signature gathering firms $1–3 per name to collect the requisite number of valid names.”); see 
Initiative Fraud, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CENTER, http://www.ballot.org/pages/ 
signature_fraud/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting that signature-gathering firms “use an array of 
tactics, such as forgery, in order to falsely qualify an initiative onto the ballot”). 
 50. See John Howard, The Death of Reform in the Capitol?: Absent Cash, Initiatives’ 
Outlook Is Bleak, CAPITOL WKLY. (Sacramento), Feb. 4, 2010, at A1 (noting that California 
campaigns typically require millions of dollars to gather enough signatures to qualify an initiative 
and that proponents of California initiatives commonly turn in a surplus of signatures to ensure 
that they have a sufficient number); Matthew Yi, Effort Heats Up to Ban Same-Sex Marriage: 
Signatures Submitted for Ballot Measure, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2008, at A1 (noting that in the 
battle over same-sex marriage, supporters of an initiative to ban it gathered over 1.1 million 
signatures in an effort to qualify on the November ballot); de Figueiredo et al., supra note 49, at 6 
(discussing how signature-gathering firms charge between $1 and $3 per signature). 
 51. See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled 
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27–28 (1978). 
 52. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 45, at 52–55 (describing Proposition 25’s elimination 
of the two-thirds-vote requirement to pass a budget). 
 53. Id. at 30–37 (describing Proposition 22’s protection of local government finances from 
state revenue declines). 
 54. Id. at 56–61 (describing Proposition 26’s requirement that extraordinary fees must be 
passed by a two-thirds vote). 
 55. Id. at 18–23 (describing Proposition 20’s expansion of the independent redistricting 
commission’s scope to cover congressional districts). 
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Haim Saban. 56 An analysis of campaign contributions to ballot 
measures in California from 1976 to 2004 shows that propositions 
that promised to benefit a particular industry or small group of 
citizens raised more money than measures that bring wider 
benefits. 57 Such funds helped these industries and groups of citizens 
at the ballot box. 58 The economics of financing direct democracy in 
modern California play a clear role in shaping the fortunes of 
piecemeal reforms. 
Legal doctrine also places nominal constraints on how 
amendments—whether they are authored by legislators or by 
citizens—can change California’s constitution. Amendments can be 
challenged if the changes they propose could be construed as so 
fundamental to the state’s governing plan that they constitute a 
revision or address more than a single subject. Yet, these constraints, 
as I argue in a later section on the curses of piecemeal reform, have 
not been interpreted in ways that prevent significant reforms. 
California’s governing plan has undergone fundamental changes 
through upheld amendments, thus pointing out the potency of 
piecemeal reform. 
III.  THE BLESSINGS OF PIECEMEAL REFORM 
Because it provides the opportunity for major change and puts in 
place fewer obstacles than other routes, the piecemeal approach has 
become the most-trafficked avenue to constitutional change in 
California. It has been utilized by reform groups such as California 
Forward, the League of Women Voters, and California Common 
Cause—members of the coalition that successfully created the state’s 
independent redistricting commission through Proposition 11 in 
2008—as well as unions, anti-tax groups, members of Congress, and 
cities pushing amendments on the November 2010 ballot. 59 What are 
the advantages that this route promises? 
 
 56. Shane Goldmacher, Competing Propositions Take Aim at California Redistricting, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/29/local/la-me-redistricting-20101029 
(noting Proposition 27’s elimination of the independent redistricting commission); CAL. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, supra note 45, at 62. 
 57. See de Figueiredo et al., supra note 49. 
 58. See id. 
 59. The Ungovernable State: As California Ceases to Function Like a Sensible State, a New 
Constitution Looks Both Necessary and Likely, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009, at 80; L.A. CNTY. 
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A.  Making Brandeis’s Theory of Laboratories for  
Experimentation a Reality 
In the 1932 case New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 60 Justice Louis 
Brandeis offered one of the most powerful and oft-quoted 
justifications for America’s fragmented, often competitive 61 system 
of federalism: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.” 62 
An important political science literature shows that states do 
indeed experiment with innovative policies and that these policies 
often diffuse around the country in predictable patterns. 63 However, 
the spread of innovative experiments does not always follow the 
laboratory model that Justice Brandeis set forth. A happy, scientific 
form of federalism might work through logical stages. Courageous 
states could make varied attempts at resolving common policy 
challenges, then observe and evaluate the effects of innovative 
policies. Successful innovations could be replicated in other states 
and on the national level, while failed policies could be abandoned. 
Instead of finding evidence of this laboratory model, the 
empirical record shows that innovations often spread across the 
country before they can be evaluated. Their replication has more to 
do with political opportunities 64 and the presence of policy 
entrepreneurs 65 than with sound judgments of policy effects and 
replication of the most successful experiments. This is true in policy 
 
BUS. FED’N, NOV. 2010 BALLOT MEASURES 1–6 (2010), available at http://www.bizfed.org/files/ 
Nov2010Measures_0.pdf. 
 60. 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
 61. For a discussion of competitive federalism and its relationship to policy innovation and 
diffusion across the states, see SAMUEL KERNELL ET AL., THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
119–21 (4th ed. 2009). 
 62. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311. 
 63. See Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 880 (1969); see also Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study, 67 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1174 (1973) (exploring the diffusion of innovation in the states in the areas of 
education, welfare, and civil rights). 
 64. See Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing 
on Political Opportunity, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 715 (1992). 
 65. See Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 738 (1997). 
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realms from lotteries to school choice 66 and extends to government 
reforms, such as legislative term limits. 67 Twenty states adopted term 
limits from 1990 to 1996, before term limits first went into effect in 
California and Maine after the 1996 elections. 68 Wherever political 
institutions and voter sentiment gave term limits a good chance of 
passage, the organized groups that supported term limits pushed for 
them without waiting for practical experience or any other evaluation 
of their effects. 69 
The piecemeal approach to reform provides an opportunity to 
follow Brandeis’s model by moving incrementally, guided by 
evaluations of effects (though it makes no guarantees that this will in 
fact be the course of reform). Instead of embarking on a 
comprehensive course toward solving all of the state’s problems at 
once, California reformers could take discrete steps, study their 
effects, and judge better what remains to be done. A decade-long 
program of constitutional change could give policymakers, 
reformers, academics, and voters a better chance to experiment, 
evaluate, and act on evidence than a headlong move towards a new 
constitution could. 
The state’s recent reform agenda provides a clear example of 
actions that could be better informed by following Brandeis’s model. 
The independent redistricting commission created by California’s 
2008 Proposition 11 has yet to be finalized, meet, or draw a single 
state legislative district. 70 Still, the November 2010 ballot contained 
both an ICA that would expand the authority of this commission to 
redistrict Congressional seats as well as those for the state 
legislature 71 and an ICA that would eliminate the commission 
altogether. 72 Both appeared to be premature attempts to replicate or 
abandon a reform experiment before it could be evaluated. Instead of 
 
 66. Berry & Berry, supra note 64, at 716–17; see id. at 741–42. 
 67. See Rick Farmer & John C. Green, Introduction: Accelerating Change with Term Limits, 
in LEGISLATING WITHOUT EXPERIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN STATE LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS 1, 
1–4 (Rick Farmer et al. eds., 2007). 
 68. See id. at 3; Clifton McCleskey, Term Limits: Should Virginia Follow Suit, VA. ISSUES 
& ANSWERS: PUB. POL’Y. F. (Nov. 1997), http://www.via.vt.edu/fall97/termlimit.html. 
 69. KOUSSER, supra note 39, at 7–12. 
 70. See Gerry Shih, Tackling Redistricting with Money and Zeal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, 
at A21. 
 71. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 45, at 18–23. 
 72. Id. at 62–67. 
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attempting to fix California’s redistricting process in one fell swoop, 
reformers should move iteratively, observing and judging the new 
commission’s impact on state legislative districts before taking on 
the next piece of reform. 
B.  Attempts at Comprehensive Reform Often Must Be  
Broken into Pieces to Succeed 
A comparative look at other states’ constitutional reform, as well 
as California’s historical record, shows that attempts at 
comprehensive constitutional reform often fail unless they are broken 
into pieces. An analysis of state constitutional conventions shows 
that nearly half of those held over the past century have failed and 
that taking a modified piecemeal path is a key to success. 
Conventions are more likely to succeed when they present voters 
with a series of separate proposals rather than with a single omnibus 
package. 73 The experiences of two large, politically divided states 
comparable to California illustrate this lesson. The omnibus package 
of reforms drafted at New York’s constitutional convention in 1967 
included changes ranging from executive reorganization to the 
environment and from consumer protection to the elimination of the 
Blaine Amendment (which prohibited government aid to religious 
schools). 74 Combining all of these contentious measures into a single 
package set before voters for an up-or-down vote doomed the 
attempt at reform. Social divisions tore apart the coalition behind the 
package, and it failed at the ballot box by a three-to-one margin. 75 
Much more successful was the approach taken by delegates to 
the 1970 Illinois constitutional convention, which put a menu of 
options before voters. 76 They combined the noncontroversial changes 
that they proposed into a single document, but then split apart four 
major, contentious issues into separate amendments. 77 Voters could 
pick and choose as they pleased, and they ended up passing the 
 
 73. See Kogan, supra note 32, at 4. 
 74. Id.; THE HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF N.Y., THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/ 
Library/1967_constitutional_convention.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 75. Galie, supra note 34. 
 76. Kogan, supra note 32, at 4. 
 77. Id.; Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Has It Made A Difference?, 8 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 571, 578–80 (1988). 
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consensus changes while rejecting all four of the controversial 
amendments. 78 The lesson for comprehensive reformers from New 
York and Illinois is that the least popular part of an omnibus package 
can sink it, so dividing difficult proposals into pieces may offer the 
best chances of electoral success. 
California’s experience with constitutional revision offers a 
similar lesson: breaking reform into pieces is more politically 
feasible than enacting comprehensive change all at once. The 
constitutional revision commission established in the 1960s had 
success with Proposition 1A, its first proposal, in 1966. It failed in 
1968 with Proposition 1, however, when the commission rolled 
reforms to education, local government, utilities, civil service, and 
other areas of the constitution into a single package. 79 Prior to the 
election the Los Angeles Times editorialized that “the electorate 
would have been better served had the proposal been less broad in 
scope,” 80 and the measure was soundly defeated. The commissioners 
learned their lesson and placed eight separate measures on the ballot 
in the primary and general elections in 1970. 81 Five of the measures 
passed. 82 California’s revision experience again shows that 
successful comprehensive reform is divided into separate slices. So 
why not start with piecemeal reform in the first place? 
C.  Public Opinion Research Reveals Few  
Intersecting Sets of Support 
One of the reasons that omnibus packages of reform fail, even 
when they avoid hot-button social issues, is that supporters of one 
reform may be opponents of another. This can be the case among 
voters even when reform leaders embrace the entire constitutional 
amendment. The set of voters backing an independent redistricting 
commission (which would take away power from legislative 
 
 78. Ann Lousin, Professor, John Marshall Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Getting to Reform 
Conference: The Illinois Experience with Constitutional Revision as It Relates to California in the 
Twenty-First Century (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://igs.berkley.edu/events/ 
reform2010_files/lousin.pdf; see Lousin, supra note 77, at 579–80. 
 79. Bernard L. Hyink, California Revises Its Constitution, 22 W. POL. Q. 637, 649–51 
(1969). 
 80. Lee, supra note 22, at 6 (recapping the 1968 and 1970 campaigns for constitutional 
revision as well). 
 81. Id. at 6–7. 
 82. Id. 
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Democrats), for instance, may not overlap with the set that supports 
reducing the two-thirds vote required to pass a budget (which would 
empower legislative Democrats). If this is the case, putting the 
reforms into a comprehensive package might doom them together 
even if each they could succeed on its own in a piecemeal process. 
In fact, voter responses to an October 2009 constitutional reform 
Field Poll (“the Poll”) show that very few packages of constitutional 
reform yield intersecting sets of support. 83 There was no lack of 
appetite for reform among the 1,005 registered voters who responded 
to the Poll. 84 When asked whether the state constitution required 
“fundamental changes,” 51 percent said yes and 38 percent said no, 
apparently opening the door to serious revision. 85 However, while 
specific proposals found some support, there was very little 
intersection between the backers of multiple measures. For instance, 
one “grand bargain” often proposed in California would package 
together the elimination of the two-thirds vote required to pass a 
budget with a spending cap that would ensure the newly empowered 
majority did not break the bank. By itself, the elimination of the two-
thirds rule had a decent level of support in the Poll, with 43 percent 
approving of the change and 52 percent opposing it. 86 The strict 
spending cap performed even better, with 48 percent of respondents 
in support and 45 percent disapproving. 87 
What does the Poll reveal about the prospects for combining the 
two ideas into a popular package? A close look at the partisan bases 
of support for each reform points out a problem: support for 
eliminating the two-thirds rule skewed left, with a majority of 
Democrats backing it while Republicans opposed the idea by a 
nearly three-to-one margin. 88 By contrast, the strict spending cap 
appealed to a majority of Republican voters, while a majority of 
Democrats opposed it. 89 This makes assembling the grand bargain in 
the electorate difficult. Throwing out undecided respondents, only 18 
 
 83. See CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 1. 
 84. See id. at 6. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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percent of voters supported both of the reforms. 90 A 60 percent 
majority was torn, supporting one reform but not the other, and 21 
percent opposed both. 91 A campaign in favor of the package would 
begin with the allegiance of fewer than one in five voters and face an 
uphill battle to persuade Californians to support an omnibus 
containing a major reform that they opposed on its own. 
Even pairing two reforms that the Poll’s respondents support did 
not guarantee success. One of the most popular proposals was 
increasing the popular vote needed to approve a constitutional 
amendment from a simple majority to a two-thirds supermajority, an 
idea supported by a 56 to 36 percent margin and backed by voters 
from both major parties as well as independents. 92 Combining this 
proposal with the imposition of a spending cap, which also enjoyed 
plurality support, did not produce an obvious winner. Only 34 
percent of voters backed both measures, while 46 percent supported 
only one of them and 20 percent backed neither. 93 Again, the 
campaign prospects of a two-pronged package appear dim. The Poll 
alone does not reveal whether the electoral fortunes of a package are 
lifted up or dragged down by its least popular item—an important 
question that could be answered using survey experiments in future 
polls—but the Poll painted a bleak picture. There does not seem to 
be a stable constituency in favor of any and all reform in the 
California electorate, presenting a challenge that bipartisan reform 
leaders in groups such as California Forward should carefully 
consider. 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. at 5. 
 93. See id. at 4–5. 
  

























D.  Avoids the Pandora’s Box of Hot-Button Policies 
A final advantage of piecemeal reforms is that they are finite, 
static proposals. After an amendment has qualified for the ballot, no 
one can take advantage of Californians’ appetite for reform by 
placing a rider on a popular amendment that veers away from 
governmental affairs into contentious social issues. This is a worry, 
by contrast, for a constitutional convention. When Repair 
California’s convention call was still a possibility, some worried that 
it would open a Pandora’s box of controversial policy battles being 
fought out within the constitution. 94 Because California’s governing 
document does in fact touch on many policy areas ranging from the 
 
 94. See Elise Viebeck, Failed Convention Post-Mortem, CAL WATCHDOG (Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://www.calwatchdog.com/2010/03/18/new-failed-convention-post-mortem. 
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definition of marriage to the right to fish, these fears were not outside 
the realm of possibility. 95 
The Poll asked voters whether they thought reform deliberations 
should be limited to the operation of government or whether the 
debate should also address issues like same-sex marriage and illegal 
immigration. 96 By a 59 to 33 percent margin, voters wanted to keep 
same-sex marriage out of the debate, but a 48 percent plurality of 
voters (over a 41 percent minority) thought that the debate should 
address illegal immigration. 97 If convention delegates did see this as 
part of their legitimate scope, public divisions on immigration could 
have doomed the process. Since voters’ views on immigration appear 
to shape their views on constitutional amendments that in no way 
impact immigration policy, 98 a convention that included the topic of 
immigration would be politically fraught. Vladimir Kogan’s cross-
state study of the success of constitutional meetings concluded that 
“[c]onventions failed, however, when their proceedings were 
hijacked by advocates of large reforms on issues for which there was 
little public consensus.” 99 Piecemeal reforms, because they cannot be 
hijacked, stand a greater chance of passage. 
IV.  THE CURSES OF PIECEMEAL REFORM 
A.  Amendments Are Constrained by Single-Subject  
and Revision Doctrines 
The most obvious disadvantage of piecemeal reform is that one-
by-one amendments ostensibly cannot bring changes as profound as 
those that might emerge from a convention or a revision commission. 
Looking closely at the interpretation of this doctrine, though, reveals 
that the constraints in fact rule out very few attempts at major 
reform. The single-subject rule requires that every part of an 
initiative be “functionally related in furtherance of a common 
 
 95. CAL. OP. INDEX, supra note 4, at 3. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Jack Citrin, Iris Hui & Thad Kousser, A Taste for Reform, Presentation at the 
Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association (Apr. 1–3, 2010). 
 99. See Kogan, supra note 32, at 5. 
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underlying purpose.” 100 Studies show that the application of this rule 
depends as much on political circumstances as on the objective 
breadth of an initiative. 101 Further, the single-subject rule has not 
kept off the ballot multi-pronged reform attempts such as 2006’s 
Proposition 89, which would have provided public funding for state 
candidate races at the same time that it brought a new regulatory 
regime to initiative-campaign finance. 102 
Amendments should not make a “far-reaching change in our 
governmental framework,” 103 such a privilege is ostensibly reserved 
to revisions. But the furthest-reaching changes to California’s 
constitution made in the past generation have both resulted from 
ICAs and survived challenges on the grounds that they constituted 
revisions. Proposition 13—which in 1978 changed property tax rates 
and assessment mechanisms, increased the legislative voting 
threshold for state tax increases and the popular voting threshold for 
local tax increases, ultimately realigning the fiscal relationship 
between state and local governments—was upheld as an 
amendment. 104 In 1990, Proposition 140 imposed legislative term 
limits and slashed the legislative staffing budget, radically shifting 
the balance of power from the legislative branch to the executive 
branch but surviving a legal challenge on the grounds that it was a 
revision. 105 More recently, the California Supreme Court initially 
upheld Proposition 8’s ban on same sex-marriage by ruling that it 
 
 100. Brosnahan v. Eu, 641 P.2d 200, 204 (Cal. 1982) (quoting Schmitz v. Younger, 577 P.2d 
652, 656 (Cal. 1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting)) (noting that the California Supreme Court has 
adopted Justice Manuel’s dissenting approach). 
 101. John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive Enforcement of the Single Subject 
Rule, 9 ELECTION L.J. 399 (2010) (presenting a recent empirical analysis showing that the 
partisan affiliation of judges appears to affect the likelihood that they will uphold initiatives 
against single-subject challenges). For a discussion of how this rule has been applied in 
California, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983). See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject 
Rule, 1 ELECTION L.J. 35 (2002) (presenting a national study that compares the discretionary use 
of the single-subject rule to a rule that was proposed and rejected at the federal constitutional 
convention that would have allowed judges to nullify congressional acts that they disagreed with). 
 102. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 
2006: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 8, 82–89 (2006) available at 
http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/pdf/ English.pdf. 
 103. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990). 
 104. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 
(Cal. 1978). 
 105. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991). 
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was an amendment rather than a revision. 106 One possible read of 
judicial doctrine in its recent application is that the revision doctrine 
may constrain the breadth of constitutional change, disallowing 
reforms that change many aspects of the state’s governing apparatus 
while allowing deep, reverberating changes that alter only one area 
of government. 
B.  Warring Reforms Can Distort Each Other’s Effects 
Perhaps a more pressing problem for the project of piecemeal 
reform is that the lack of coordination between approaches to 
reforms prevents individual amendments from acting in concert. 
Separate amendments can bring disjointed or even antagonistic 
changes. Reforms pushed by disparate, often-warring authors can 
work at cross purposes, distorting each other’s effects. The 2010 
battle of redistricting initiatives is the most obvious example, 107 but 
not the first. Even amendments proposed by allied forces can interact 
in unpredictable ways.  
During the 1979 tax revolt, Howard Jarvis’s Proposition 13 was 
closely followed by the “Gann Limit” on expenditures of tax 
revenues. 108 Jarvis and Gann were allied political entrepreneurs, but 
Jarvis’s initiative so drastically reduced the state’s tax revenues that 
Gann’s spending limit became virtually a dead letter that had the 
primary effect of pushing the state to raise more in fees. 109 
The campaign finance changes brought about by Proposition 34 
in 2000 have made it easier for parties—rather than candidates—to 
raise political funds. This may have created a weapon that party 
organizations can use to play a greater role in determining their 
standard bearers now that the 2010 “top-two” primary amendment, 
which gives parties great incentives to clear the field for one 
 
 106. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 107. See Daniel Lowenstein, Viewpoints: Time to Broaden Redistricting Reforms? No, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 2, 2010, at 13A; supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. But see 
David Pacheco, Viewpoints: Time to Broaden Redistricting Reforms? Yes, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Oct. 2, 2010, at 13A. 
 108. ARTHUR B. LAFFER ET AL., RICH STATES, POOR STATES: ALEC-LAFFER STATE 
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 73–74 (2d ed. 2009). 
 109. See Thad Kousser et al., For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure 
Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 331, 351 (2008); Thad Kousser et 
al., When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, 
Colorado, Utah, and Washington, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
TO BUDGET POLICY 290–91 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008). 
  
594 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:569 
candidate, has passed. When one political change goes into effect, it 
alters the environment that another reform is intended to affect. This 
interaction can reshape the impact of multiple reforms. Cross-state 
comparisons have shown that legislative term limits have a much 
different impact on states with professional legislatures, such as 
California, than they have on citizen statehouses. 110 Because there 
have been recent calls both to alter California’s term-limit law and to 
turn the legislature into a citizen body, 111 it is important to consider 
the complex interactions between these piecemeal reforms. 
C.  The Catch-22 of Financing Reform 
Interest groups qualify piecemeal reforms for the ballot, rather 
than the reforms being placed on the ballot by a convention or 
commission that in some way represents the state. These interest 
groups often turn to direct democracy because the legislature would 
not pass their proposals, and their proposals reach the ballot because 
the groups have the resources to fund professional signature-
gathering campaigns. This means that the types of proposals that 
become the substance of the piecemeal process will be qualitatively 
different from the types of reforms that emerge from the convention 
and revision processes. It also means that reforms promising benefits 
for a narrow group have a better chance at qualifying for the ballot as 
ICAs than as reform attempts with broader constituent bases. Since 
voters are not fools, the flip side of this advantage is that narrow-
interest initiatives, once qualified, have a lower chance of ultimate 
passage. Overall, this reduces the chances that the ICA process will 
produce reform results. The fate of Repair California’s attempt to 
uses two ICAs to call a constitutional convention illustrates this 
challenge. 
 
 110. Farmer & Green, supra note 67, at 1, 4–9 (discussing the results of a cross-state 
comparison of legislative term limits where states are grouped by the level of legislative 
professionalism). See generally Karl T. Kurtz et al., Introduction to INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF TERM LIMITS 1, 3 (Karl T. Kurtz et al. eds., 2007) (“One of 
our key findings . . . is that the impact of term limits . . . is greatly affected by two factors: the 
degree of professionalism of the legislator and the restrictiveness of the term limit.”). 
 111. John Marelius, Critics Seek a Part-Time California Legislature, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Mar. 1, 2010, at A1; Anthony York, Term Limit Tweak May Be Heading Back to Ballot: 
New Initiative Closely Resembles Failed 2008 Measure to Change Law, CAPITOL WKLY. 
(Sacramento), Oct. 8, 2009, at A7. 
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After 2009’s summer of love and hope for Repair California’s 
constitutional convention idea turned into a fall troubled by 
campaign logistics and then into a winter of discouraging failure, 
Californians were reminded once again what a tough trick it is to 
fund a reform campaign. There was no lack of enthusiasm for the 
constitutional convention idea; thousands of supporters turned out at 
town hall meetings across the state, newspapers editorialized about 
the idea in glowing terms, and Governor Schwarzenegger rarely 
missed a chance to voice his support for it. 112 Yet the harsh reality is 
that none of this enthusiasm turned into cold hard cash to support a 
signature-gathering effort. 
This failure illustrates the catch-22 that reform groups always 
face: it is hard to raise money for ballot measures that do not help 
any narrow interest, but it is nearly impossible to obtain broad 
support for measures that appear to provide a special benefit. The 
first part of this dilemma is easy to read from the story of Repair 
California. Holding a constitutional convention, with all of the 
uncertainty about what might emerge from it, did not clearly align 
with the interests of any major political camp, industry, or 
benefactor. Support may have been a mile wide, but it was only an 
inch deep among the groups that could write the six- and seven-
figure checks necessary to fund a serious campaign. 
The second part of the dilemma can be seen in recent cases of 
reform propositions that made it to the ballot but failed to win a 
majority vote because they appeared too tilted toward their 
benefactors’ interests. Proposition 89, the California Nurses 
Association’s 2006 initiative for “clean money” and direct-
democracy campaign finance reform, provided comprehensive 
campaign finance changes. 113 The initiative also included a few 
provisions that clearly benefited unions and could help the nurses 
 
 112. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Wrong Fix for California, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A27 
(discussing the positive response of the state’s major newspapers to the question of a 
constitutional convention); Skelton, supra note 6 (“Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger says he 
‘absolutely’ loves the idea of holding a constitutional convention to overhaul state government.”); 
Press Release, Repair Cal., Government Reform Coalition Submits Measures to Call California 
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 113. See Dan Morain, Prop. 89 Takes on Election Funding, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at 
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push for single-payer healthcare reform, a long-time policy goal. 114 
As laudable as those goals may have been, changing the rules to 
benefit a special-interest group did not appear fair to voters, who 
rejected the proposition handily. 115 In 2008, Assembly Speaker 
Fabian Nunez and Senate leader Don Perata funded Proposition 93, 
which would have changed term limits and, not coincidentally, 
extended both Nunez’s and Perata’s careers. 116 Again, many strong 
arguments could be made for this initiative, but the opposition only 
needed to focus on these two scandal-plagued legislative leaders to 
turn voters against the measure. 117 
The path of piecemeal reform requires ICAs to overcome two 
hurdles. The first, qualifying for the ballot, is steepest for broad-
based reforms that lack specific patrons. The second, obtaining 
majority support on election day, is hard for any measure that, no 
matter how much good it might do for the state, promises even 
greater benefits for the narrow group that placed it on the ballot. 
Together, these obstacles have doomed many attempts at 
constitutional change. 
D.  Narrow Victories for Amendments Change  
Constitutions on a Knife’s Edge 
Of course, some reform measures have succeeded, though often 
by strikingly narrow margins. In recent years, a remarkable number 
of major reforms have passed or failed by a knife’s edge in a state 
that now has 37 million residents: 118 
• 2010’s Proposition 14, the top-two primary, won by 
398,287 votes 119 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Pros & Cons—In Depth: Ballot Measure: California Fair Elections Act, LEAGUE OF 
WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL., http://www.cavotes.org/vote/election/2010/february/16/               
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2010) (discussing the failure of Prop 89, with 74 percent of California constituents voting no on 
the measure). 
 116. Op-Ed., Corruption of a Good Idea, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 15, 2008, at B6. 
 117. Jim Boren, Passive-Aggressive Lawmakers Just Play to the Crowd, FRESNO BEE, 
Feb. 10, 2008, at J3. 
 118. See Harris, supra note 3, at 3. 
 119. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 8, 2010, STATEWIDE DIRECT 
PRIMARY ELECTION 19 (2010), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/                   
2010-primary/pdf/19-votes-for-against.pdf (noting there were 2,868,945 votes for Prop 14 and 
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• 2008’s Proposition 11, setting up a redistricting 
commission, won by 197,378 votes 120 
• 2008’s Proposition 93, which would have amended term 
limits, lost by 613,360 votes 121 
• 1990’s Proposition 140, which instituted term limits, won 
by 311,781 votes 122 
These close outcomes for major constitutional changes raise the 
question of whether there should be any limits on the changes that a 
simple majority can make to state government, especially in lower-
turnout primary elections. Though the decisions on the constitutional 
amendments listed above reflect the preferences of the median voter, 
they each left a very large minority of voters unhappy. This is 
especially troubling given evidence that members of racial and ethnic 
minorities sometimes end up on the losing end of direct democracy 
elections. 123 Of course, this is a hazard of all majoritarian decision 
processes. In the case of California constitutional reform, though, 
three arguments can be made against passing piecemeal reforms on a 
knife’s edge. 
First, when a constitutional amendment wins by a narrow 
majority, the election does not signal that the winning reform is the 
median voter’s ideal governing structure; it merely shows that the 
median voter prefers it to the constitutional provision that existed 
before the election. The amendment’s proponents only have to beat 
the status quo, giving them outsized agenda-setting power in return 
for the resources that they spent to qualify for the ballot. 124 This is a 
particular problem for piecemeal initiative reform because the 
process does not allow for amendment. At a constitutional 
convention, in a revision commission, or on the floor of the 
legislature, moderate representatives could offer changes to bring the 
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ultimate constitutional proposal closer to what the median voter 
wants. Lacking this process of give and take, piecemeal reform 
allows the amendment’s sponsors to craft one-sided measures that 
will succeed as long as they can narrowly defeat the status quo. 
Second, simple-majority vote rules that allow would-be 
reformers to ignore wide swaths of the electorate raise the specter of 
allowing the winners in an electoral system to write the rules of the 
game for their further benefit. This is a particular danger in a state, 
like California, where constitutional amendments may be passed in 
primary elections or even special elections, such as those held in 
2003 and 2005, that have especially low turnout, 125 It might be 
possible to pass ICAs that put up obstacles to political participation, 
such as voter identification laws, with a narrow majority in a low-
turnout election. The manipulation of electoral rules for the benefit 
of a temporary majority has a long history in American politics. 126 
Third, it presents an illogical asymmetry that California’s 
constitution requires supermajorities to make so many decisions, but 
a simple majority can amend it. With two-thirds votes in the 
legislature required to pass a budget or to raise taxes, and 
supermajority popular votes required to pass many local taxes and 
bonds, amending the state constitution is one of the easier tasks in 
California politics. It is often noted that 1978’s Proposition 13 
imposed some of these super-majoritarian provisions, when the ICA 
itself fell short of two-thirds supermajority support, winning with 
64.8 percent of the vote in the primary (and thus lower-turnout) 
election. 127 To many voters, this asymmetry does not make sense. 
When the Poll asked whether a two-thirds popular vote should be 
required to amend the constitution, 56 percent favored this change 
and only 36 percent opposed it, with voters of all party stripes 
supporting it at equal rates. 128 
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V.  CONCLUSION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
California’s current path of constitutional reform—a meandering 
medley of disparate amendments pushed by a fractious set of authors 
rather than a comprehensive project of revision—may be surprising 
given the magnitude of the state’s governing crisis. But it should not 
be surprising that we are on a piecemeal path given California’s 
constitutional history and the records of other states. University of 
California, Berkeley, political scientist Bruce Cain subtitled his 
review of California’s constitutional change as follows: “The 
Triumph of Amendment over Revision.” 129 This is the way that the 
Golden State muddles through reform with today’s approach a 
microcosm of our long-standing tradition. 
If piecemeal reform is our political reality, how can this 
common tool be used best? I conclude by advocating an approach 
that draws on the strengths and combats the characteristic 
weaknesses of piecemeal reform: reformers should assemble a series 
of bipartisan “reform logrolls” that each tackles a single subject. 
Each logroll would combine something that left-leaning voters desire 
with a reform in the same area preferred by the right. The logrolls 
could be proposed in sequence, allowing reformers, voters, and 
scholars to carefully consider the impact of shifts in one area before 
moving on to fix the next area, thereby making Brandeis’s 
experimental theory a reality. Reforms would be put before voters 
one at a time, avoiding the electoral vulnerability that harmed many 
omnibus comprehensive constitutional changes. Like other 
piecemeal reforms, these amendments would also avoid opening the 
Pandora’s box of divisive social debates. 
This approach picks up many of the advantages of piecemeal 
reform and simultaneously avoids its drawbacks. Because each 
logroll would contain two provisions focused on a single area of 
government, the piecemeal reforms would avoid single-subject 
challenges and most likely be safe against revision challenges. If 
legislators or groups like California Forward assembled the 
bipartisan deals, the reforms would not distort each other’s effects 
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because they would be planned and drafted in concert. This approach 
would get around the catch-22 of financing reform. The narrower 
interests represented by both sides would put up the initial funds, and 
when measures qualified for the ballot, their bipartisan nature would 
give them broad appeal. The authors of such reforms would still face 
the challenge of putting together nonintersecting coalitions to back 
their initiatives. They would have to compromise to succeed at the 
ballot box. This would compel them to assemble coalitions like the 
one that pushed Proposition 1A’s revisions to overwhelming victory 
in 1966 130 and thus avoid making major changes on knife’s edge. 
Concrete examples of reforms that have the potential to fit this mold 
include the following: 
• A majority-vote logroll that would eliminate the two-thirds 
requirement to pass a state budget in exchange for 
abolishing the legislative leadership’s control over the 
“Suspense File,” which stops bills that might win majority 
support from ever reaching the floor of the legislature. The 
first part of this deal would ensure that the party that wins a 
legislative majority can shape the state’s spending plan 
while the second part would give the minority an equal 
voice in the legislative process by allowing their bills to 
pass or fail on their merits. 131 
• A logroll that reduces legislative term limits—the total 
length of time for which legislators can serve—from 
fourteen to twelve years but allows legislators to serve all 
of their time in one house or the other as long as voters 
keep electing them. An ICA that would enact this change 
has qualified to appear on the next statewide ballot after 
November2010, with the petition drive funded by a 
coalition of Los Angeles business and labor groups. 132 
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• A logroll requiring that ballot measures, whether they 
mandate new programs or cut taxes, pay for themselves. 
Many propositions include politically popular provisions 
but do not provide a clear source of funding for the new 
programs or tax cuts that they create. A reform designed to 
combat fiscal irresponsibility on both the left and the right 
would require any measure that seeks to increase spending 
or cut revenues to identify a source—either spending cuts 
or revenue increases—to pay for itself. A constitutional 
amendment to require this, Senate Constitutional 
Amendment 14, 133 was introduced during the 2009–2010 
legislative session, but it stalled awaiting a vote on the 
senate floor. In the Poll, 75 percent of surveyed voters 
supported this proposal, with support coming evenly from 
Democrats, Republicans, and independents. 134 
By themselves, none of these changes would resolve 
California’s constitutional challenges. Piecemeal reforms never do. 
But a sustained project of coordinated, incremental reforms that 
assemble broad coalitions in support of their limited aims appears to 
be the most promising path to reform in California. 
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